The Pontiac Building was constructed as a speculative project by the architectural firm Holabird and Roche between 1889 and 1891 on Dearborn and Harrison streets in Chicago's South Loop. The clients were Peter C. Brooks, a Boston real estate investor, and his Chicago real-estate agent, Owen Aldis. Because this area was becoming known as Printer's Row, it is often assumed that the Pontiac Building was intended (planned) for printers and publishers from the outset. However, the working drawings for the building and two important letters written by Aldis to Brooks reveal that this was not the case. The building went through many changes from its initial stages in 1884 up to and during its construction between 1889 and 1891. As Aldis noted in a letter of 1885, "the building is as flexible as possible, and can be used for many purposes and easily changed."^This was not simple indecision. Flexibility was consistently "designed-in" during all stages of planning and construction. This built-in flexibility is particularly striking in light of accounts of the development of American architecture and urbanism offered by the contemporary architect and theorist Rem Koolhaas and art historian Hubert Damisch.2 Damisch and Koolhaas argue that American modernism in architecture and urbanism was unformulated and unconscious, in contrast to the highly theorized self-consciousness of European modernity. As Damisch put it, "By remaining implicit, the growth of New York and Chicago takes on the appearance of a natural power, if not a cataclysm.""^In this argument, architects are considered essential elements within an economic growth cycle which they could at most contain but could not control. Here, Damisch and Koolhaas invoke a stereotypical opposition between the planned and the chaotic.
However, the working drawings for the building and two important letters written by Aldis to Brooks reveal that this was not the case. The building went through many changes from its initial stages in 1884 up to and during its construction between 1889 and 1891. As Aldis noted in a letter of 1885, "the building is as flexible as possible, and can be used for many purposes and easily changed."^This was not simple indecision. Flexibility was consistently "designed-in" during all stages of planning and construction. This built-in flexibility is particularly striking in light of accounts of the development of American architecture and urbanism offered by the contemporary architect and theorist Rem Koolhaas and art historian Hubert Damisch.2 Damisch and Koolhaas argue that American modernism in architecture and urbanism was unformulated and unconscious, in contrast to the highly theorized self-consciousness of European modernity. As Damisch put it, "By remaining implicit, the growth of New York and Chicago takes on the appearance of a natural power, if not a cataclysm.""^In this argument, architects are considered essential elements within an economic growth cycle which they could at most contain but could not control. Here, Damisch and Koolhaas invoke a stereotypical opposition between the planned and the chaotic.
Rather than exemplifying the above model, the Pontiac project actually seems more analogous to Koolhaas' own agenda to consciously recuperate the unconscious modernism at work in early urban metropolises. Using this strategy and theory for his own architectural prac-jU i^i!^ii-hJn'^i fWai' H-Ml. . 1U Mr iftiU^/nrr~-ll0 u-mty * «i)m> i Dearborn Street December 1885 tice, Koolhaas attempts to recover some intentional agency by "articulating" the forces of modernization rather than merely responding to them. Architectural firms like Holabird and Roche, and real estate developers and investors like Owen Aldis and the Brooks brothers, were indeed conscious of economic and urban instability in the modern capitalist city. They attempted to Integrate and anticipate this instability within their planning strategieseven if they did not explicitly theorize it as such. They too engaged in "forward-looking extrapolations"^and "built in flexibility"^as described in and about Koolhaas' own writings and projects.
Instead of considering instability as a condition external to planning, as something merely to be "contained," it can be accounted for in planning. Instability is thus partially integrated and "articulated" as a pragmatic and flexible approach to design in the face of changing conditions.T he design process of the Pontiac Building was a contingent and flexible one. Contingency denotes a connection depending for its existence, occurrence, or character on something not yet certain. The Pontiac was not only a speculative building, but one sited in the still underdeveloped area of lower Dearborn Street. To respond to such conditions it had to be flexible, as Aldis noted in his 1885 letter. Flexibility is the capability to adapt to new, different, or changing requirements materially and programatically. Thus, flexibility is a response to a condition of contingency. This does not imply, however, that flexibility is only a passive response to that condition. On the contrary, any speculative building had not only to accommodate flux and instability in its immediate economic and urban environment, but also to anticipate it. For once contingency is incorporated into the very fabric of building, architecture's viability qua architecture is called into question. In rapidly changing urban centers like Chicago, buildings that were inflexibleunable to adapt to new, different, or changing requirementsquickly became obsolete.' The degree of flexibility and contingency built into a structure, however, was greatly dependent on its location. In The Pontiac was not designed as a predetermined entity, a building intended for the printing industry from the outset. Knowing this, the problem of planning can be tackled materially and the temporal dynamics of this project can be addressed. The Pontiac Building had multiple, overlapping plans, that were worked out and deposited in material traces such as letters, drawings, and the actual structure. These plans have different temporalities even though they are threaded through, or located in, a single building. As Henri Focillon wrote, "From the fact that various modes of action are contemporaneous, that is, seized upon at the same moment, it does not follow that they all stand at an equal point in their development."^Through flexible planning, the Pontiac could respond to both immediate rental needs and less immediate ones imagined in the future life of the building.
The letters written from Owen Aldis to Peter Brooks in public assembly use; 100 pounds for office use; and 70 pounds for apartment buildings. Aldis and company chose the maximum live load for the Pontiac Building whether or not it was going to be used for light manufacturing. Such overbuilding, or building to the maximum capacity live-load use possible, countered one of the major oppositions made during the late 19th century to the highrise building, as cited by scholars Carl Condit and Sara Bradford Landau: "the building designed exclusively as office space results in low-unit floor loading, making it impossible to convert to other purposes such as warehouses, library, or public use." 'Â lthough this limitation could be overcome at a later date if the owner was willing to spend the money, it was probably more economical to overbuild from the outset, anticipating possible changes of function in the future life of the building.
Flexibility also required the shifting of partitions and quick subdivision of floors to suit tenants. According to the 1885 letters, stores were alterable to any configuration. Also as Aldis noted, "If changed to a hotel or office building, all the partitions are to be of very light hollow tile, and the building is constructed strongly enough to support such partitions and extra weight easily."^^And indeed it was, because the building was overbuilt to support light manufacturing. The Pontiac's combination of iron structure and load bearing walls formed a strong armature that increased stability and potential alterability. The need for such an armature Is prescient considering the following passage taken from the June 1885 letter: "Please observe along the iron girders where dotted lines go. ..so that the joists and flooring may at any time be taken out in the center of the building, with small trouble and expense, and a shaft for light with skylight put through the center of building if changed into an office building or hotel. "^' To allow this sort of negation of its own structure, excess weight was necessary to keep the building programmatically flexible yet structurally stable. By July of 1885 Owen Aldis and Peter Brooks postponed construction due to the underdevelopment of the area and the desire for a stronger and cheaper building.
The Pontiac site was too risky, as Dearborn remained unpaved in this area and building development had not extended far enough south to assure Aldis and Brooks that their building would not remain stranded on its lot. It appears that no construction was undertaken until 1889. An August 10, 1889 article in the Economist indicated that construction had begun on a twelve story building on the Pontiac block. In another article from September 7, 1889, the building was advertised as a "first class office building with floors heavy enough for printing and light manufacturing purposes." " It appears that the building was over-programmed to compensate for the uncertainty of the urban environment. One might expect the program would solidify as the building neared completion. The above-mentioned article indicates, however, that this was not entirely the case. The working drawings for the Pontiac Building, preserved In the Chicago Historical Society, suggest that flexibility remained a major concern throughout the construction process.
A floor plan published soon after completion and a photograph of the building under construction show Its major features. These include two large piers of stone and brick in the southwest and southeast corners of the building, two interior bearing walls of brick, and a party wall to the north. The building now had a hybrid frame of steel and load bearing interior walls which provided a more rigid structure than the one described in the letters. Holabird and Roche were experimenting with such hybrid constructions in other buildings at the same time. In the Tacoma building (1886-1889), for example, the interior load bearing walls function as both wind bracing and support.^" This type of armature created a rigid perimeter around an interior core that could then be easily manipulated. In the gas piping plans for the building a dotted rectangle in the center of the building indicates where a future light court could be cut out from the solid structure of the building's girders, frames, joists, and flooring. The light court would have extended from the third to the thirteenth floor. " The floor framing was designed to support the weight of the light well's presumably terra cotta or brick interior walls. In the third floor framing plan, the rectangular light well is clearly marked, corresponding to the dotted lines in the gas piping plans.
